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Previous research shows that power-sharing political systems are associated with (a) 
individual perceptions of political inclusiveness and (b) a more deliberative news media 
supply. Little, however, is known about the effect of this institutional feature on exposure to 
crosscutting views through the media. We posit that political systems provide different 
degrees of institutional power and public visibility to political parties and minorities, and this 
difference affects crosscutting news exposure. Survey data from three countries (N = 5,500 
individuals) show that media contribute more to crosscutting exposure in a consensus 
system (Italy) than a polarized pluralist variant of majoritarianism (Spain), or a hegemonic 
illiberal democracy (Mexico). Additionally, analyses reveal that minority views are positively 
correlated with crosscutting media exposure in a consensus system and a polarized pluralist 
variant of majoritarianism, but not in a hegemonic system. These findings suggest that 
certain political system characteristics can override the tendency for selective exposure. 
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Well-functioning democracies require a citizenry that is frequently exposed to a balanced diet of pros 
and cons on public issues (Baker, 2006; Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002). Previous research has 
shown compelling evidence that frequent exposure to divergent viewpoints enhances political tolerance (Mutz, 
2002); awareness of multiple perspectives and political learning (Price, Cappella, & Nir, 2002); ability to set 
aside win–lose approaches (Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004); legitimacy and satisfaction with a political 
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These valuable outcomes can be endangered, however, if citizens’ frequent media diets provide 
only one-sided views of the issues of the day. As extensive studies in the body of literature show, news 
media can activate party or political heuristics to evaluate political content by making partisan identities 
salient (Lelkes, 2016), thereby contributing to audiences becoming segregated along political lines (Sears 
& Freedman, 1967). This is particularly the case in media landscapes that feature a strong correspondence 
between parties or broader political trends and media outlets (strong political or media–party parallelism), 
where the media tend to be politically instrumentalized, journalistic advocacy traditions are the norm, and 
media organizations are under pressure to compete for minimally or unmotivated news audiences (Goldman 
& Mutz, 2011; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Van Kempen, 2007). 
 
Past research has devoted less attention to investigating the extent to which the political 
institutional context—for example, electoral rules, party systems, and proportional representation—can 
offset features of media systems that are facilitators of selective exposure. This gap in the literature is 
striking given that political regimes and their institutional design seem to explain a great deal of variation 
in news exposure patterns across countries (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Previous studies have shown that 
power-sharing systems (Lijphart, 2012; Powell, 2000) aimed at representing parties and interests more 
inclusively (proportional representation, multiple parties, coalitional governments, parliamentary systems) 
have a spillover effect on actual political representation and deliberation in news media coverage (Wessler 
& Rinke, 2014). Power-sharing systems also moderate the role of citizens’ motivations, preferences, and 
abilities in explaining exposure to political information (Nir, 2012). 
 
In this study, we heeded the call from Wessler (2008) and Wessler and Rinke (2014) to investigate 
how institutional features at the political system level affect the news media demand side—that is, patterns 
of exposure to political information through the media. We argue that where political systems offer more 
opportunities for political representation and exposure to a diversity of viewpoints (power-sharing systems), 
individual exposure to non-like-minded or crosscutting information will be greater than in systems that favor 
political majorities, and more than in illiberal democracies, where a political group concentrates a great deal 
of executive and legislative power and is barely rendered accountable (Bochsler & Kriesi, 2013; Merkel, 
2004). Specifically, we expected that different levels of political power sharing will override the tendency of 
citizens to self-select information in highly partisan and advocative media environments by making them 
feel better represented and enhancing familiarity with non-like-minded viewpoints. 
 
To test this assumption, we investigated crosscutting media exposure through a three-country 
comparison: Italy, Spain, and Mexico. In choosing those countries, we fill a gap in comparative studies, 
which have traditionally scrutinized patterns of political information use in a select group of well-established 
democracies in Western Europe (Esser & Steppat, 2017; Wessler & Rinke, 2014). We rely on survey data 
from the Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP) collected in three countries with high levels of 
media–party parallelism, meaning highly partisan and advocative mainstream news outlets and few 
committed news readers (Durante & Knight, 2012; Fernández-Alonso, 2008; Fernández-Quijada & 
Arboledas, 2013; Goldman & Mutz, 2011; Guerrero, 2014; Guerrero & Márquez-Ramírez, 2014; Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004; Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002; Hibberd, 2007; Ripollés, 2009; Van Kempen, 2007), 
but with a broader range of political system types that differ in substantial ways. Our analyses show that 
the media make a greater contribution to crosscutting exposure in a consensus system that qualifies as a 
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power-sharing system (Italy) than in a proportional system where political power is more concentrated 
around broader political majorities (Spain), and that there is also a greater contribution in both of those 
system types than in illiberal settings (Mexico; Bochsler & Kriesi, 2013; Merkel, 2004). 
 
We also investigated how minority status (support for a minority party) related to crosscutting 
exposure in these three political system types because the level of inclusiveness provided by power-sharing 
type systems is expected to increase the willingness of less visible political groups to encounter 
disagreement in the media. Our results offer evidence that being in a political minority is positively 
associated with crosscutting media exposure in a consensus system and a proportional system with 
majoritarian outcomes, but not in a system with a hegemonic power structure and illiberal trends (Bochsler 
& Kriesi, 2013; Merkel, 2004). The implications of these results are outlined in the concluding section. 
 
Media–Party Parallelism and Crosscutting Exposure 
 
Media systems that feature a strong correspondence between parties or broader political trends 
and media outlets are fertile ground for selective exposure to flourish. Previous studies have shown that 
where political or media–party parallelism is high, citizens are less likely to encounter non-like-minded views 
in the media than in countries where media partisan alignments are weaker (Goldman & Mutz, 2011; Hallin 
& Mancini, 2004; Van Kempen, 2007). 
 
Extensive studies in the body of literature have shown that people tend to self-select when seeking 
mediated political information (e.g., Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Mutz 
& Young, 2011). Reading or watching content that is in line with one’s political views functions as a heuristic 
that makes political information easier to process, reduces the ambiguity of political opinions, and 
encourages citizens to follow the news and be politically attuned (Mutz, 2006; Newton & Brynin, 2001; Taber 
& Lodge, 2006). Frequent news media users, as well as strong partisans, politically sophisticated individuals, 
and those who discuss politics with people other than family and friends, tend to search for like-minded 
political information in greater numbers (Garrett, 2009; Mutz & Mondak, 2006; Prior, 2007; Stroud, 2011; 
Taber & Lodge, 2006; but see Arceneaux & Vander Wielen, 2017; Castro, Nir, & Skovsgaard, 2018; Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; and Sidanius, 1985 for contradictory evidence). However, individual 
predispositions do not solely explain political news consumption patterns. Systemic factors are powerful 
predictors of media usage that can help us explain variances in the likelihood of encountering congenial 
information across countries. 
 
In particular, Goldman and Mutz (2011) and Mutz and Martin (2001) provided evidence that the 
use of news media in line with one’s views is much more likely where the media are overtly partisan. Media 
systems with more prevalent media–party parallelism cause individual political predispositions and affections 
to play a bigger role in people’s political information and media habits. For example, where public service 
broadcasting is strong, citizens tend to share common news-viewing habits. Conversely, in systems with 
less consolidated traditions of public media, people’s political motivations and abilities (individual 
partisanship, interest, knowledge) are much more important determinants of news exposure than in 
countries where public TV standards for reporting political information, such as political diversity or quality 
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news, are widespread and spill over into other media outlets (Aalberg & Curran, 2012; Iyengar et al., 2010; 
Pfetsch, 1996; Reinemann, Stanyer, & Scherr, 2016). 
 
High levels of political parallelism also tend to go hand in hand with less committed news audiences 
and lower average newspaper readership (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Media owners tend to use partisanship 
as a strategy for product differentiation when media organizations experience significant pressure to reach 
minimally motivated or unmotivated news audiences. Low newspaper readership is, therefore, correlated 
with news audience fragmentation. As a comparison between use of (offline and online) news outlets in 
Norway, Japan, the UK, and the United States illustrates (Elvestad & Phillips, 2018), in countries where 
newspapers are strong, fewer news brands reach a major proportion of the population (Norway and Japan), 
as compared with more fragmented and polarized news audiences in the United States. Indeed, citizens in 
countries with “a low share of news avoiders are also less polarized in their choice of news sources” (p. 15), 
as Elvestad and Phillips (2018) further posited. Finally, where a select group of political elites own the 
mainstream media and exert a great deal of influence on media regulation and political reporting, citizens 
tend to use and seek political information based on ideological leanings (Guerrero & Márquez-Ramírez, 2014; 
Tworzecki & Semetko, 2012). Overall, individuals are more prone to select information in line with their 
political preferences where activating partisan heuristic cues is a particularly useful way to make news 
decisions or where opportunities to encounter non-like-minded information by coincidence are limited, as is 
the case in media systems with high levels of media–party parallelism. 
 
Power Sharing and Crosscutting Exposure 
 
Certain political systems’ characteristics can also affect citizens’ exposure to diverse political views 
through the media. As previous research posited (Kriesi, 2012), news journalists provide more or less 
visibility to different political voices depending on the actual power of politicians and parties, thereby 
following the structure of the political system. We argue that in power-sharing systems, where power is 
more diffuse and, for example, political incumbents are less known by the public, the news media will cover 
a broader range of political actors and their discourses. In addition, politicians will have greater incentive to 
respond to each other and stress the political differences between them, and citizens will be more open to 
and prone to encounter non-like-minded news information because they feel better represented by their 
political and media institutional contexts. We therefore expect the level of power sharing in a political system 
to offset the tendency of media organizations to target specific audiences along party lines and override the 
tendency of citizens to seek like-minded political information. 
 
First, previous studies have shown a spillover effect from a political system’s ability to include and 
voice diverse perspectives to the media and public opinion. Wessler and Rinke (2014) investigated the 
impact of the political institutional context on political diversity in news media content. The authors found 
that in systems where political power is shared among a wide range of political parties and interest groups 
(power-sharing systems), television news demonstrates more deliberativeness and internal pluralism than 
in power-concentrating (or majoritarian) systems and defective democracies (Vartanova, 2012). Where 
political power is more evenly distributed between government and opposition, the incumbency bonus in 
news coverage has also been found to be of less importance (Schoenbach, De Ridder, & Lauf, 2001). 
Conversely, the media in majoritarian and presidential systems tend to convey personalized and dramatized 
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portrayals of a smaller number of well-known powerful actors than in consensus systems (Switzerland), 
where the news media follow the power structure of the political system (Kriesi, 2012). 
 
Second, political systems that aim to distribute institutional power more inclusively (proportional 
representation, multiple parties, coalitional governments, parliamentary systems) may not only have a 
spillover effect of the promotion of political diversity in media content (as illustrated by the findings from 
Wessler & Rinke, 2014), but also may further provide incentives for politicians to highlight differences 
between themselves and their political rivals. Nir (2012) showed that in more competitive political systems 
with multiple parties, politicians need to exert greater efforts toward making their policy options visible and 
clearly differentiating themselves from each other, which in turn makes people feel more represented and 
politically engaged. 
 
Third, we argue that actual political inclusiveness and representation at the institutional level will 
affect the perceptions of inclusiveness at the individual level. As established by the aforementioned studies, 
high levels of political power sharing are expected to moderate the news media’s one-sided portrayals of 
the issues of the day and, most important for the purposes of this study, offset people’s tendency to actively 
seek like-minded media outlets. This is because power-sharing systems promote the tendency for people to 
feel represented, especially those belonging to less visible or less powerful political groups. We elaborate on 
these arguments in the next section. 
 
Perceived Inclusiveness and Crosscutting Exposure 
 
A second expectation regarding the impact of institutional power distribution on crosscutting media 
exposure concerns citizens holding minority views. In particular, we expect political minorities to be more 
likely to select information across lines of political difference in systems where their representatives have 
greater access to institutional power. Such citizens may feel more politically represented and decisive in 
these systems. In general, members of a political minority experience more disagreement because they 
have fewer chances to encounter like-minded others (Huckfeldt, Ikeda, & Pappi, 2005; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 
1995). In countries with more majoritarian electoral systems, political minorities may feel even more ignored 
because they actually have fewer incentives to cast the “losing” vote in a district, and their vote can barely 
make any difference (Hopmann, 2012). In contrast, in countries with more proportional power structures, 
citizens have greater political choice and are likely “to find someone who represents their interests; they 
are less likely to feel alienated and indifferent” (Nir, 2012, p. 555). Previous studies have shown that the 
media can mirror highly inclusive political power structures (Wessler & Rinke, 2014) and can also generate 
spillover from citizens’ affections for and trust in the political system to attitudes toward the media 
(Hanitzsch, Van Dalen, & Steindl, 2018). We therefore expect that in environments with less perceived 
hostile opinions regarding minority political groups and parties, these groups will have their voices heard 
more and be more visible in the political and media arenas. Such circumstances make it less likely that 
citizens will experience feelings of exclusion (Christiansen, 2004), and as a result, they will judge non-like-
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Summary and Hypotheses 
 
Figure 1 presents an outline of our theoretical considerations thus far. 
 
 
Figure 1. Determinants of crosscutting media exposure. Note. The dashed path was not tested; 
all cases are constant at high parallelism. 
 
We conceptualize a dimension from the least political power sharing to the most. On one anchor, 
a consensus system (coalitional government, proportional representation, multiple parties, parliamentary 
system) distributes institutional power evenly, and there are few barriers to newcomers, small parties, and 
marginalized groups entering the political playing field. On the opposite anchor, and as an extreme case of 
a power-concentrating system, an illiberal presidential system with a hegemonic power structure provides 
disproportionate political influence to the party in government and operates under a weak system of checks 
and balances that renders the executive and legislative branches unaccountable. In between is a polarized 
pluralist variant of majoritarianism with a parliamentary system of government, a multiparty system, and a 
proportional electoral system that yields stable political majorities and a moderately fragmented legislative 
chamber (Bochsler & Kriesi, 2013; Dahl, 1956; Lijphart, 2012; Powell, 2000). 
 
We anticipate that the level of power sharing of a given political system will override citizens’ 
tendencies to self-select in more overtly partisan and fragmented media environments (high media–party 
parallelism). We expect to see this latter pattern particularly clearly among political minorities, whose views 
tend to be less publicly visible and can be made more salient in more inclusive political systems. The media 
in countries where power is spread among a broader range of political actors follow the institutional dynamics 
of the political system, where politicians need to be attentive and regularly respond to a broader range of 
political opponents and their policy agendas. This is in contrast to power-concentrating systems, where 
personalized and negative media portrayals of a few political leaders are to be expected (Kriesi, 2012), 
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making less newsworthy minority voices feel excluded, and where non-like-minded political information is 
judged more defensively. Thus, Figure 1 depicts political power sharing as a contextual factor increasing 
individuals’ crosscutting exposure and amplifying the role of minority status on the individual likelihood of 
encountering non-like-minded views through the media. 
 
To test these guiding assumptions and relationships, we relied on data from three countries—Italy, 
Mexico, and Spain—that share high levels of media–party parallelism, but also represent distinct examples 
of the three political system types just outlined. Media systems in these countries are characterized by 
journalistic advocacy traditions, politicization of public service broadcasting or broadcasting regulations, 
instrumentalization of private media, low newspaper reach, and a large number of news avoiders 
(Brüggemann, Engesser, Büchel, Humprecht, & Castro, 2014; Durante & Knight, 2012; Fernández-Alonso, 
2008; Fernández-Quijada & Arboledas, 2013; Goldman & Mutz, 2011; Guerrero, 2014; Guerrero & Márquez-
Ramírez, 2014; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002; Hibberd, 2007; Ripollés, 2009; 
Van Kempen, 2007), all of which are earmark characteristics or traits of media systems with high levels of 
political parallelism (Brüggemann et al., 2014). 
 
At the same time, Italy qualifies as an example of a consensus system (Bochsler & Kriesi, 2013; 
Lijphart, 2012); it has a tradition of governmental coalitions, a strong political role for interest groups (Hallin 
& Mancini, 2004), and a bicameral parliamentary system and proportional electoral system that have 
brought about a highly fragmented and at times volatile party system despite multiple attempts at reforms, 
including some majoritarian components (Morlino, 1996).2 Spain has been defined as a polarized pluralist 
variant of majoritarianism (Lijphart 2012; Wessler & Rinke, 2014), or a proportional system with 
majoritarian outcomes (Hopkin, 2005). Until 2015, the Spanish political system was characterized by a 
proportional electoral system that de facto punished national third parties (because of a combination of the 
d’Hondt system and small electoral districts), by single-party governments, and by a multiparty system that 
after 1982 became an imperfect two-party system (Linz & Montero, 2001).3 Finally, Mexico’s presidential 
system and mixed electoral system contribute to strengthening existing political majorities by rewarding 
them in single-member districts, while at the same time segregating the opposition front by granting a 
significant share of assembly seats to different minority parties in multimember districts (Diaz-Cayeros & 
Magaloni, 2001). Mexico is considered an illiberal democracy, with further structural deficits such as weakly 
controlled executive and legislative branches, a so-called captured liberalism that embeds economic elites 
and members of the civil society in clientelistic networks, and criminal insecurity, all of which compromise 
 
2 For a recent overview of Italy’s electoral reforms, see Chiaramonte and Emanuele (2018).  
3 As with Italy, Spain’s party system has recently undergone a breakdown, with the emergence of three new 
parties—Podemos, Ciudadanos, and Vox—in direct competition with the long-lasting Socialist Party (PSOE) 
and Popular Party (PP) since the 2015 and 2019 (for Vox) general elections. The stability of the new political 
landscape, however, has yet to be seen because the results of three of the four latest parliamentary elections 
and a vote of no confidence against President Rajoy (PP) have only served to keep government by 
mainstream parties afloat (either PP or PSOE). High electoral volatility also makes it very difficult to 
determine “whether we have reached a situation of stable equilibrium, or whether we are still in a transitional 
phase” (Castillo-Manzano, López-Valpuesta, & Pozo-Barajas, 2017, p. 160). 
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civil rights and freedom of the press (Bochsler & Kriesi, 2013; Guerrero, 2014; Hughes & Márquez-Ramírez, 
2018; Merkel, 2004). 
 
Therefore, we tested the proposition that in consensus systems where institutional power is more 
inclusively distributed, crosscutting media exposure will be more prevalent than in a polarized pluralist 
variant of majoritarianism, and media will contribute more to crosscutting exposure in both settings than in 
a hegemonic political tradition with illiberal trends. In other words, we hypothesized that 
 
H1: Greater political power sharing increases the likelihood of crosscutting media exposure. 
 
And we predicted that 
 
H2: Supporters of minority parties would be more likely to encounter non-like-minded views in the media. 
 
We also hypothesized that 
 
H3: An interaction effect such that minorities would be particularly open to encountering crosscutting 
views in the media in a consensus system with the greatest power sharing. 
 




To test the hypotheses, we used data from the Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP; 
Gunther, 2019), which contains information on political preferences, patterns of news consumption, and 
political discussants from more than 5,500 individuals (Italy n = 1,508; Mexico n = 1,600; Spain n = 2,411). 
Data on national representative samples were collected during presidential (for Mexico) or legislative (for 
Spain and Italy) elections, spanning a period from 2012 to 2015. Individuals were interviewed face-to-face, 




To measure crosscutting media exposure (XEm), we used questions concerning party preferences (for 
the most recent vote) and the individual’s perception of the party or candidate who is treated more favorably 
by the newspaper or news show that he or she most frequently reads or watches.5 We created a binary variable 
where 0 indicated agreement with the party favored by one’s favorite media outlets, and 1 otherwise. We built 
 
4 For further details on question wording, sampling methodology, and data collection, see the technical 
report and survey questionnaires at https://u.osu.edu/cnep/. 
5 Individual party preference was operationalized by using the question, “Can you tell me which party you 
voted for in the most recent (general) election?” Perceived party preference of media outlets (newspapers 
and TV) was constructed from an item that probed “Which party or candidate was treated more favorably?” 
by each respondent’s favorite/most read or watched newspaper and TV channel. 
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an average index by summing each individual’s responses for newspapers and TV news shows, where the 
combined index scores ranged between 0 and 1 (see Dilliplane, 2011, for a similar approach). 
 
We additionally operationalized crosscutting exposure in interpersonal discussions (XEd). To gauge 
the media’s contribution to crosscutting exposure, we benchmarked average levels of crosscutting media 
exposure against levels of crosscutting exposure in informal political discussions and analyzed media–
interpersonal gaps by political system types (consensus, proportional, or illiberal setting).6 The main reason 
for this methodological decision was that levels of crosscutting exposure by any means of communication may 
be biased by individual and country-level idiosyncratic factors. People tend to encounter disagreement 
essentially through two modes of communication: through the media and in political discussions. Many of the 
factors explaining why people encounter non-like-minded views (motivations, cognitions, opportunities) apply 
to both forms of crosscutting exposure, that is, interpersonal and mediated (see, e.g., Matthes, Knoll, 
Valenzuela, Hopmann, & Von Sikorski, 2019, for a recent overview). In other words, a great number of reasons 
why a certain individual may seek non-like-minded views and perspectives could span both communication 
modes. Therefore, the media–interpersonal gap allowed us to isolate the exact role of the media in making 
people more or less likely to cross-select across lines of political difference. As an example, say that levels of 
crosscutting media exposure are found to be stronger in Spain than in Italy. Now let us assume that during 
the Spanish 2015 election campaign, political polarization was unusually high, and differences between leftist 
and rightist parties were particularly salient and easy to identify. Had we taken the crosscutting media exposure 
indicator alone as evidence of greater levels of crosscutting media exposure in a polarized pluralist variant of 
majoritarianism compared with a consensus system, we would have dismissed the fact that in 2015, it was 
particularly easy for Spanish citizens to identify party leanings of their frequent media outlets (and frequent 
discussants). A simple comparison of aggregated average levels of mediated and interpersonal crosscutting 
exposure solved the issue by discounting this contextual factor and provided a more accurate picture of the 
media’s contribution to levels of crosscutting exposure in each political system as compared with the others. 
 
XEd was constructed from the questions tapping the party preference of the person with whom 
each interviewee discussed politics most frequently.7 The distance between an individual’s political 
preferences and the reported preference of his or her frequent political discussant was measured by creating 
a binary variable (0 = agreement, 1 = disagreement; see Klofstad, Sokhey, & McClurg, 2013, for a similar 
approach). To capture minority status, we built on a measure where a value of 0 was assigned to those who 
voted for the party in office in the most recent election, and 1 to those who did not. We opted for this 
solution because assessing minority status by using any measure of ideological intensity (i.e., how far an 
individual is from a majoritarian view on a given scale) risks capturing extremity or attitude strength instead 
(see Wojcieszak, 2015) Our empirical approach also captures the ability of a party to be politically decisive 
and newsworthy without setting any arbitrary cutoff point between majoritarian and minority views based 
on a particular factor—for example, vote shares. It is also less sensitive to institutional and political 
idiosyncrasies than, say, measures that rely on whether parties achieve the election threshold or which 
 
6 For a similar comparison of the media–interpersonal gap to gauge media’s contribution to communication 
across political lines, see Mutz and Martin (2001). 
7 Respondents were asked to state the person with whom they discuss politics most frequently and whether 
they knew which party this person voted for. 
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issues parties own. Finally, our approach allowed us to be consistent with the operationalization of our 
crosscutting measures, which captured political consistency between people and media by using party ID. 
 
We created an additional variable accounting for the strength of social ties with one’s discussants, 
because previous research showed that those who frequently discuss politics within their core social 
networks (family members and friends; Mutz & Mondak, 2006) experience high emotional costs from 
disagreeing and tend to be less tolerant of non-like-minded views (Hopmann, 2012; Klofstad, McClurg, & 
Rolfe, 2009). The strength of social ties was constructed from an item that probed, “Who is the person with 
whom you discuss politics most frequently?” We assigned 0 to those naming colleagues and neighbors, and 
1 to those who named another family member or a friend. 
 
Subjective political interest was also included as a control, with responses categorized from not at 
all (0) to very interested (3), and a scale index of political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Taber 
& Lodge, 2006) was constructed by summing up the correct answers to three to six questions on national 
and international politics. To control for the amount of political information each individual consumed (Norris, 
2000), we also accounted for frequency of exposure to campaign news (1 = never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = 
often, 4 = always).8 Individual partisanship was operationalized to detect the presence of any party 
attachment (Huckfeldt et al., 2005). Respondents were asked the extent to which they felt close to a party 
(dummy coded). Further sociodemographic variables (age, education) were also included as controls. 
 
Political Power Sharing and Crosscutting Media Exposure 
 
Our first hypothesis was that more political power sharing increases the likelihood of crosscutting 
media exposure (H1). Therefore, the contribution of the media to crosscutting views should be lower in 
illiberal settings than in countries with a proportional system with more majoritarian outcomes, and even 
lower than in a consensus system. 
 
Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) using the ratio of crosscutting media exposure to our benchmark 
of crosscutting exposure in political discussions as a dependent variable and the countries as independent 
variables provided partial support for the assumption of crosscutting media exposure variance across 
different political landscapes. This analysis shows that (a) there are statistically significant differences across 
countries, F(2,696) = 4.12, p < .05, and (b) a consensus system (Italy) had the highest average level of 
this ratio, followed by a more power-concentrated system (Spain). More specifically, the media—as 
compared with interpersonal communication—played a more important role in individual levels of 
crosscutting exposure in a consensus system than in an illiberal one (Mexico), as revealed by a Tukey post 
hoc test (.107 ± 0.38, p = .012). Bivariate analyses between Italy and Spain or Spain and Mexico revealed 
no statistically significant differences. 
 
 
8 For reasons of data availability, for Italy, the amount of political information was assessed through a 
question probing, “How frequently did you read articles on political topics during the election campaign in 
recent months?” 
International Journal of Communication 14(2020)  Political Power Sharing  2717 
Mean comparisons of levels of crosscutting media exposure and average degree of crosscutting 
exposure through political discussions by levels of political power sharing provided robustness to the 
previous tests and further illustrated the exact magnitude of the media–interpersonal gap within each 
political system and the importance of the interpersonal benchmark. We found that the contribution of the 
media to crosscutting exposure (M = .365, SD = .019) was significantly higher than that of interpersonal 
communication (M = .228, SD = .025) in a consensus system, t(284) = 4.647, p < .001. While average 
crosscutting news media (M = .463, SD = .019) seemed to be more important in a proportional system with 
majoritarian outcomes than in a consensus system, we found this average to be no stronger than the 
average crosscutting exposure in political discussions (M = .430, SD = .035), and the difference between 
them was not significant in this system type, t(199) = .829, p > .1. By contrast, in illiberal settings, political 
discussions seemed to result in the highest levels of political deliberation (M = .472, SD = .034), but the 
differences with crosscutting news media exposure (M = .437, SD = .023) were not significant, t(213) = 
−.867, p > .1. 
 
Taken together, these results seem to offer evidence that the media make a greater contribution 
to crosscutting exposure in political systems that enable greater access to power and presence of political 
diversity than in countries with more hegemonic political traditions, as anticipated. Post hoc analyses of the 
nature of political discussions in different countries (frequency, weak/strong ties) shed light on plausible 
underlying mechanisms explaining the media advantage in power-sharing systems, in particular as 
compared with more defective democracies. Our analyses showed that only respondents from an illiberal 
democracy tended to engage in crosscutting political discussions with closer friends and family (close ties) 
more often than with coworkers or neighbors (weak ties; see Appendix).9 A great number of respondents in 
an illiberal setting seemed to feel more comfortable discussing politically contentious issues with safer and 
more frequent political discussants—that is, with family and friends. This exception seems to be rooted in 
perceived sanctions for speaking up and seeking dissenting views, and the implications are discussed in the 
final section of this article. 
 
Support for Minority Parties and Exposure to Non-Like-Minded Views 
 
Our second and third hypotheses predicted that those supporting minority parties would be more 
likely to experience crosscutting media exposure (H2), especially in more power-sharing systems (H3). 
Therefore, minorities should use more crosscutting media in a consensus system than in a proportional system 
with majoritarian outcomes, and even more than in an illiberal democracy with a hegemonic power structure 
 
9 Results from a logistic regression with XEd as the dependent variable and strength of social ties as the 
main independent variable (with XEm, interest, partisanship, news exposure, political knowledge, being in a 
minority, and sociodemographics as controls) showed a positive, yet not significant, impact of social ties for 
an illiberal setting: b = .536, p = .212, OR = 1.709, 95% CI [.736, 3.971]. The same regression model 
reestimated with the other country samples revealed negative and significant log coefficients for social ties 
for a consensus system, b = −1.186, p = .009, OR = 0.305, 95% CI [.125, .745], and for a more 
majoritarian system, b = −1.372, p = .020, OR = .253, 95% CI [.079, .806]. In other words, in a consensus 
system and a proportional system with majoritarian outcomes, the weaker the relationship with discussants, 
the greater the chance of encountering non-like-minded views when discussing politics. 
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As shown in Table 1, being in a political minority was positively linked to crosscutting media 
exposure in a consensus system and a polarized pluralist variant of majoritarianism, but not in an illiberal 
setting. Respondents belonging to a minority reported significantly more exposure to dissimilar views 
through the media in a consensus system and a proportional system with majoritarian outcomes, even after 
controlling for political interest, news exposure, and other variables (for Italy, beta = .387, p < .001, for 
Spain, beta = .242, p < .1). In contrast, the relationship between minority status and crosscutting media 
exposure was negative for an illiberal setting (beta = −.189, p < .05). Put differently, being in a majority 
seemed to be positively correlated with crosscutting exposure in a system with more hegemonic and illiberal 
power structures.  
 




To further illustrate between-country differences, we ran a regression model with cluster-robust 
standard errors using the merged data set (Italy, Mexico, and Spain). In this model, we included a cross-
level interaction of minority status and country in order to assess how different degrees of political power 
sharing may affect the likelihood of minorities to encounter non-like-minded views in the media. Whereas 
supporting a minority party raised crosscutting news media exposure by 0.279 on a 1-point scale in a 
consensus system (highest levels of political power sharing), in a more power-concentrating proportional 
system, the predicted effect was 0.175, and in an illiberal democracy (highest power concentration), the 
expected impact of minority status on XEm was −0.118. The marginal effect of minority status on 
crosscutting media exposure by power sharing levels is illustrated in Figure 2. The slope was steeper for 
consensus than for more majoritarian systems, showing a more important impact of minority status on 
crosscutting media exposure in the former than in the latter. The figure also depicts the negative coefficient 
for an illiberal setting highlighted earlier. 
 
Consensus system Proportional majoritarianism Illiberal democracy
Minority 0 .262 (0.045)*** 0.168 (0.058)** ⎯0.134 (0.050)**
Crosscutting in Political Discussions 0.058 (0.052) 0.091 (0.050)* ⎯0.004 (0.050)
Political Interest 0 .072 (0.033)** 0.008 (0.038) 0.003 (0.023)
Political Knowledge 0.010 (0.026) 0.060 (0.027)** 0.042 (0.018)**
Political News ⎯0.039 (0.027) ⎯0.000 (0.008) 0.011 (0.008)
Social Ties 0.033 (0.072) ⎯0.063 (0.070) ⎯0.057 (0.059)
Partisanship 0.163 (.0180)* 0.089  (0.059) ⎯0.071 (0.046)
Age ⎯0.000 (0.001) 0.003 (0.002)* 0.001 (0.002)
Education ⎯0.004 (0.019) 0.001 (0.020) 0.025 (0.016)
Constant 0.015 (0.180) 0.224 (0.069)*** 0.498 (0.042)***
R-squared .174 .149 .131
N  221 140 208
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets.  *Signficant at 10% level;**Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level. Source: CNEP 2013, 2015, 2012.
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Figure 2. Marginal effect of minority status on crosscutting media exposure (XEm) from the most 
to the least power sharing. Note. Data from an OLS regression model with clustered-robust 
standard errors. More power-sharing systems amplify the impact of minority status on 
crosscutting media exposure. 
 
Overall, the results showed that while minorities in illiberal democracies tend to avoid uncongenial 
views, in proportional systems with majoritarian outcomes, and most significantly, in a consensus system, 




Crosscutting media exposure is of unquestioned importance to democracy, as an essential factor 
in deliberative thinking (Wessler, 2008; Wessler & Rinke, 2014). Studies of its antecedents have focused 
on individual explanations (Garrett, 2009; Garrett & Stroud, 2014) and less often on the media context 
(e.g., Goldman & Mutz, 2011). In this study, we focused on the potential role of institutional features as 
promoters of crosscutting exposure, comparing three countries with highly partisan media and differing 
political systems. 
 
Our findings showed that the news media made a greater contribution to citizens’ crosscutting 
exposure in consensus systems that represent people and political interests more inclusively than in more 
power-concentrating systems or settings with a hegemonic tradition. The extent to which political systems 
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political predispositions and exposure to uncongenial views through news media. In particular, holding 
minority views was positively correlated with crosscutting exposure in consensus and proportional systems 
with more majoritarian outcomes, but not in illiberal settings. As we reasoned in the expectation for H3, 
minorities might feel more alienated and less motivated to hear the other side where they have less chance 
to be politically relevant (illiberal settings) than where they are granted more public visibility (consensus 
systems). Overall, systems where political power is less concentrated seem to offer more opportunities for 
encountering dissimilar views through the media and may offset the importance of media system 
characteristics in explaining news media habits. 
 
Our study has further implications. The results suggest that the contribution of media to citizens’ 
exposure to diverse views might be difficult to generalize beyond the United States (Mutz & Martin, 2001), 
especially in countries where there are harsher sanctions and higher costs for seeking out and expressing 
dissenting views. In less consolidated and power-sharing democratic settings, the media are no more 
important drivers of communication across lines of political difference than personal political discussions 
are, according to our findings. Post hoc analyses showed that citizens in an illiberal setting with a hegemonic 
power structure seemed to discuss politics with safe and more private circles of the family. This is in line 
with European countries that have had recent undemocratic experiences, such as Spain (Lup, 2015). Most 
important, citizens in a hegemonic setting with illiberal trends also seem to disagree within such safe circles 
(running counter to past findings in the United States; see Huckfeldt et al., 2005; Mutz & Mondak, 2006). 
Experiencing disagreement with close siblings has been shown to increase individual political engagement 
(Lee, Shah, & McLeod, 2013). The tradeoff of this phenomenon is that potential societal benefits of 
crosscutting discussions with family members and friends may have a limited scope where people do not 
pass on crosscutting information to others beyond their close networks. 
 
The conclusions of the present study are limited by the ability to generalize from a specific and 
small country sample. In particular, Italy is a specific case of consensus democracy (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; 
Kriesi, 2004). The party system in the country collapsed in the 1990s, paving the way for the inception of 
Forza Italia, which increased the influence of the media on politics by placing a great amount of 
communicative power in the hands of Silvio Berlusconi. This contingency may have diminished the potential 
beneficial effects of a power-sharing system on minorities and interest representation in the media as 
compared with more majoritarian democracies. A more detailed analysis considering specific political 
dimensions (number of parties, electoral systems, coalitional governments) that accounts for more 
paradigmatic cases of power-sharing democracies (Switzerland, Belgium) and also takes into account 
countries with more consolidated traditions of majoritarianism than Spain would strengthen our conclusions 
and avoid idiosyncratic interpretations of the impact of the distribution of political power on patterns of news 
consumption. In this vein, further operationalizations of crosscutting exposure accounting for factors such 
as ideological distances or issue positions between individuals and their media diets could also help uncover 
whether Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) voters have better chances to cross-select in Mexico, 
given that this particular party, which has been in office for more than 70 years, is highly politically and 
economically heterogeneous. 
 
Future research might also address further contextual antecedents of crosscutting exposure 
(aggregated access to education, distribution of wealth) given that the accessibility of information outside 
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interpersonal networks is scarce in economically and educationally unequal societies (Smith, 2016). Overall, 
comparative explanations such as those that we pursued in this study reveal that political system features 
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Appendix: Difference Between Crosscutting Exposure in the Media and in Political Discussions 





Note. The y-axis shows the relative importance of the media over interpersonal networks as sources of 
exposure to dissimilar views (XEm - XEd ). Whereas in a consensus system and polarized pluralist variant of 
majoritarianism, the media make a greater contribution to diverse viewpoints among those discussing 
politics with close siblings, in an illiberal setting discussion, networks play a bigger role. Conversely, among 
those discussing politics with not-so-close individuals (coworkers or neighbors), the media add to exposure 
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